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Abstract
We quantify the heavily oil-dominated WEF nexus in three Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
countries (Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia) across spatial scales and over time, using available
empirical data at the national level, and explore the exposure to nexus stresses (groundwater
depletion) in other countries through virtual water trade. At the domestic scale, WEF trade-offs
are fairly limited; while all sectors require considerable amounts of energy, the requirements
for water and food production are modest compared to other uses. At the international scale,
revenues from oil exports in the GCC allow the region to compensate for low food production and
scarce water availability. This dependency is dynamic over time, increasing when oil prices are low
and food prices are high. We show how reducing domestic trade-offs can lead to higher exposure
internationally, with rice imports originating in regions where groundwater is being depleted.
However, Saudi Arabia’s increased wheat imports, after reversing its food self-sufficiency policy, have
had limited effects on groundwater depletion elsewhere. Climate change mitigation links the WEF
nexus to the global scale. While there is great uncertainty about future international climate policy,
our analysis illustrates how implementation of measures to account for the social costs of carbon
would reduce the oil and gas revenues available to import food and desalinate water in the GCC.
1. Introduction
Despite the economic prosperity that the six states of
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC1) enjoy [1], eco-
nomic challenges as a result of recent fluctuations in
oil prices [2, 3] have exposed strategic risks, includ-
ing securing long-term sustainable access to and use
of water and food resources [4]. The GCC states
rank among the lowest in the world in terms of
per capita freshwater resources [5] and soil fertility
[6], but among the highest in domestic water [7],
energy consumption—mainly for cooling—and CO2
emissions [8]. The decrease in crude oil prices led to
significant budget deficits in recent years in several
1 Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United
Arab Emirates.
GCC states (8% of GDP in Saudi Arabia in 2017, 17%
of GDP in Kuwait in 2016 and 20% in GDP in Oman
in 2016) [1].
None of the GCC states is self-sufficient in food
and water; all rely heavily on imports (food products
and virtual water in food products) from other coun-
tries [9] and seawater desalination [5] to sustain their
needs. Harsh climatic conditions and scarce water
resources have beenmajor impediments for the devel-
opment of the agriculture and water sectors. None
of the GCC states have renewable water resources
greater than 500 m3/capita [1], far below the widely
used ‘water scarce’ threshold of 1000 m3/capita-year
[10]. To meet their freshwater needs, GCC states have
developed into world leaders in the application of
seawater desalination technology with an installed
desalination capacity in 2012 of 18 million m3 of
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by IOP Publishing Ltd
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water per day [planned to expand 40% by 2020 [11]].
Desalination is, in turn, highly energy intensive [12]
and a costly process [13].
Food security through conventional domestic
agriculture has been deemed unsustainable and an
unattainable goal due to environmental and water
resource constraints [14–16]. Excluding Saudi Ara-
bia and Oman, any meaningful attempt to support
domestic agricultural production is thus strongly
dependent on the availability of energy (i.e. burn-
ing more oil, and in future possibly solar) to desal-
inate seawater and brackish groundwater water for
irrigation, to treat and reuse domestic waste water
or using highly controlled environmental condi-
tions in closed agricultural systems [5], but these
techniques are currently too expensive to be used
for staple crops [17]. GCC states therefore secure
food resources by importing food from interna-
tional markets, made possible by revenues from oil
exports. This risks aggravating nexus trade-offs in
food exporting countries, with unsustainable use of
groundwater in these countries one of the major
concerns [18, 19].
The deep interlinkages between the availability of
water, energy, and food resources have been termed
the water-energy-food (WEF) nexus [20]. Nexus
debates are fundamentally about scarcity in natural
resources and the recognition that water, energy,
food, and other resources are interdependent [21, 22]
at multiple spatial and temporal scales [23–25].
To date, the nexus interlinkages for the GCC
states have received limited attentionwith the concept
not widely used [26]; one likely reason being the
abundance of oil which obscures any shortages in
other sectors. Abulibdeh, Zaidan [27] sketch themain
drivers of change in the region’s WEF nexus. Sid-
diqi and Anadon [12] illustrate the water require-
ments of oil production and energy generation, and
the energy need for water pumping and desalin-
ation. Keulertz and Woertz [28] explicitly address
the importance that energy exports had for dir-
ecting the GCC countries towards food imports,
as an alternative to improving their WEF resource
management. The trade dimension of the nexus,
mainly in the form of virtual water as a solution
to domestic nexus challenges, receives more atten-
tion in the Middle East literature compared to the
global WEF nexus literature [16, 29, 30]. Pioneer-
ing work by Allan [31], and subsequently many oth-
ers, has greatly refined understanding of quantitat-
ive elements of virtual water (water footprinting [32])
and the wider political economy of water and food
security in the Middle East [26, 28]. Some (e.g. [33]),
have suggested that a shift to renewables, as part
of the climate mitigation response, might signific-
antly affect the income sources that most of the Gulf
States rely on and their capacity to mask domestic
WEF nexus trade-offs through oil exports and food
imports.
Previous methodologies applied to the nexus in
the Middle East use comparatively more qualitat-
ive approaches and discuss the nexus conceptually
(including policy papers), for instance [28, 29, 34–
38]. Data requirements of nexus models are difficult
to satisfy [39] and their compatibility can pose prob-
lems [40]. The few studies that use time-series data
are primarily descriptive [41, 42]. Where quantitat-
ive methods are applied, it is often a quantification of
two sector linkages [12, 43]. This mirrors the general
nexus literature, where most nexus studies synthes-
ize dual connections of water-food, energy-water and
food-energy, or only conceptually address the com-
plete WEF nexus [44–50]. More elaborate quantitat-
ive analyses include a life cycle analysis (LCA) model
of food production systems [51, 52] and a scenario-
based, integrated framework tool [53], both tested
for Qatar. Grindle, Siddiqi [54] use a water footprint
approach with energy input analysis, combined with
assessments of virtual water trade and foreign direct
investment for food production.
There are significant knowledge gaps in the way
the WEF nexus of each state in the GCC is domestic-
ally dependent on its economic performance, region-
ally interdependent on each other’s WEF nexus, and
globally affected by the impact of climate variability
and change on the world’s food producers. The aim
of this paper is to characterise in a quantitative fash-
ion themultiple scales of theWEF nexus for the GCC,
using three characteristic GCC states as examples;
Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, covering the largest
and most populous GCC state (Saudi Arabia) with a
considerable agriculture sector, a city state depending
on oil exports (Kuwait) and a city state with a more
diverse economy but still high dependence on gas
exports (Qatar). We examine the nexus at three scales
and their dynamics through time: the domestic nexus,
which involves internal dependencies, trade-offs, and
co-benefits amongst WEF nexus resources within
the country; the international nexus, with exports
and imports linking a country’s domestic nexus to
those in the countries it imports from, and, finally;
the global scale through an illustrative example of
the extent to which climate change mitigation policy
might impact oil revenues.
2. Methodology
2.1. Approach
The analysis uses open-source data from interna-
tional databases on resources interdependencies sup-
plemented with national reports and an analysis of
trade flows. One common problem with quantify-
ing the nexus, and with many nexus studies, is that
the sectors are measured in different units and are
to some extent incommensurate and therefore rarely
compared directly. To address this issue we convert
and present the nexus flows in comparable units—
million barrel of oil equivalents (MBOE). For nexus
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linkages that could not be expressed in MBOE, their
relative importance is presented. We consider the
period between 2000 and 2016, for which the most
comprehensive and complete data were available (see
below).
2.2. Domestic nexus
Our model of the domestic nexus is similar to the
simplest form of an input-output analysis, e.g. an
assessment of the amount of oil (i.e. energy) used to
desalinate water and, vice versa, the amount of water
needed to produce oil which includes both extraction
and processing. Resource use was either quantified,
for those linkages that could be expressed in MBOE
compared to total oil produced, or visualized and dis-
cussed in relative terms, such as water use compared
to total renewable water resources.
Energy usage by sector and disaggregated by
energy source was taken from the International
Energy Agency (IEA) World Summary Energy Bal-
ance [55]. Domestic agriculture’s energy consump-
tion is split in on-farm energy use such as for traction,
heating and power, and energy use via the energy-
for-water linkage providing irrigation water through
groundwater pumping and waste water treatment.
The agricultural sectors in Kuwait and Qatar are
too small for the IEA to report their final energy
consumption; we assumed their energy intensity
of agriculture to be the same as Saudi Arabia’s.
Energy requirements for irrigation were computed
from energy intensities for groundwater pumping
in Abderrahman [56] and average agricultural water
withdrawals [5].To explicitly calculate energy use for
domestic water supply, we used reported estimates
of energy intensities for groundwater pumping [56],
waste water treatment [12] and desalination [57]. As
energy intensity varies by desalination technique, a
country-specific average energy intensity for desalin-
ation was derived by weighting intensity by installed
capacity of each technique.
Water use data for household and agricultural
purposes were taken from AQUASTAT, the UN Food
and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) global inform-
ation system on water resources and agricultural
water management [5], though, because it is survey-
based, frequent data gaps mean it is difficult to build
continuous time series. We linearly infilled missing
data over the study period, under the assumption
that these data change incrementally [5]. Regarding
desalination, the website Mordorintelligence.com, a
market advisory firm, has biennial data on total pro-
duction of desalination plants for Kuwait, Qatar and
Saudi Arabia.Netwater use estimates for the oil sector
are rare, so we used water use per barrel of oil intens-
ity estimates from the Kuwait Institute for Scientific
Research for Kuwait [58] and reported values from
Siddiqi and Anadon [12] for Saudi Arabia and Qatar,
multiplied by the annual amount of oil produced, to
calculate the total water need of energy production.
None of the three countries use significant land areas
for the production of biofuels [55] and the limited
area under agricultural use is unlikely to greatly affect
runoff in this (semi-)arid region, making the food
(i.e. land use)-to-water and food-to-energy linkages
marginal.
2.3. International nexus
Limited domestic food production is compensated by
imports, financed by oil (i.e. energy) exports. Annual
oil and gas exports, measured in physical quantities,
were taken from the IEA’s World Summary Energy
Balance [55]. Oil spot prices, the currentmarket price
at which oil is bought or sold for immediate pay-
ment and delivery, come from the Organization of
Oil Producing Countries, OPEC. Countries spend a
share of their oil export revenues on food imports.
To estimate the quantity of oil that must be expor-
ted to meet food import demand, the value of total
agricultural imports was divided by the price of oil.
Resource Trade Earth data [59] were used to estim-
ate agricultural imports and export. These are based
on the United Nation’s trade database, UN Comtrade
[60], a repository of official international trade stat-
istics, and provide aggregated figures on the value of
total agricultural imports by country.
The reliability of food imports, and their price,
depends to some extent on sustainable management
of the water, energy and land resources that under-
pin the production of these food crops. Importing
food thereby generates exposure to nexus trade-offs
elsewhere. As an indicator of this exposure, we use
the amount of groundwater depletion for irrigation
(GWD) embedded in international food trade [18].
GWD is defined as the volume of groundwater that
is abstracted for irrigation use in excess of the nat-
ural recharge rate and irrigation return flow, account-
ing for environmental flow requirements, and thus
corresponds to an unsustainable use of groundwater
for crop production. GWD contributed approxim-
ately 20% to the global gross irrigation water demand
for the year 2000 and is largest in the Indo-Gangetic
plain, followed by the United States, Iran, China,
Mexico and Saudi Arabia [19]. Most of the crops
grown with it are locally consumed, but some are
exported.
We used data from Dalin et al [18] on global,
country-specific GWD intensities for wheat and rice,
staple food crops for this region and the two crops
contributing most to global GWD transfers [18]. We
also analysed the GWD of barley, one of the main
feed crops both in the GCC and globally, but since
barley is grown mainly under rainfed conditions and
is relatively low (water) input intensive, GWD is low
and we do not further report on it. We then multi-
plied the bilateral trade flows of these commodities
(based on FAOSTAT, FAO’s repository for food and
agriculture datamost of which is provided by national
statistics offices [14], with trade data corrected for
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re-export following Kastner [61] to link consump-
tion patterns to the origin of primary products), by
the GWD intensity of each commodity in the coun-
try of export to obtain theGWDvolume embedded in
food trade. GWD intensities were based on the aver-
age of the years 2000 and 2010, the two years forwhich
these data have been compiled. Using either GWD
intensities based on 2000 or 2010 gave only minor
differences in total GWD imports to the three GCC
countries (on average within 4% for rice and 12% for
wheat), suggesting that simulated GWD is fairly con-
stant.
Bilateral trade-flows are more dynamic and data
for 2000 to 2016 were used to follow the evolution
of trade and embedded GWD over time. A general
decline in the overall quality and availability of agri-
cultural statistics on production and trade has been
a cause of concern, with the response rate to FAO’s
questionnaire in the Middle East among the lowest
globally [62], and with collection methods, statistical
expertise and harmonization of data varying between
countries [62, 63]. We checked for consistency, elim-
inating countries from our trade matrices that had
negative consumption, with exports exceeding pro-
duction plus imports, due to either missing or incor-
rect data (this affected on average, in a year <5%
of countries, and in almost all cases small, or island
states). Country imports should be similar to exports
as reported by exporting countries, with small dif-
ferences possible due to different reporting methods
for imports and exports [60]. Export data were used
to supplement three years of missing import data for
Kuwait and Qatar.
2.4. Global nexus
Climate change, among other things, links each coun-
try’s and the region’s nexus to the global scale.
Given the dominant importance of oil revenues in
the region and their contribution to global climate
change we explore what mitigation policy might
mean for revenues in relation to food import costs.
Attempts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in order
to achieve the ambitions to combat climate change as
expressed in the Paris Agreement or to account for the
social cost of carbon (SCC)may influence demand for
oil—and/or its price. Using common estimates on the
cost of impacts and the emissions from a barrel of oil
we estimate the exposure of the nexus to policies that
are likely to affect the volume or price of oil exported.
We use two types of SCC estimates. First, among the
state-of-the-art contemporary estimates of the SCC
are those provided by the US Environmental Protec-
tion Agency [64] for the period 2010 to 2050. Run-
ning three Integrated Assessment Models (IAM) they
calculated impacts of carbon emissions on agricul-
tural productivity, energy demand, human health,
property damages from increased flood risk and the
value of ecosystem services, among other things. We
use the midrange estimate (at a 3% discount rate)
of 42 USD/tCO2 in the year 2020 which, combined
with 0.43 tCO2 per barrel, gives a SCC estimate of
18 USD per barrel. Second, a more robust estimate
is considered the marginal cost of carbon, the cost
required to make a transition to reach a certain car-
bon limit and temperature rise below a certain tem-
perature level, expressed as a price of carbon. Using
an agreed target reduces the uncertainty inherent in
the range of IAM impact estimates and leaves room
to consider impacts that might not be so easily quan-
tified. For this we draw from Dietz et al [65], who
provide the marginal cost of carbon for 2020 and
the decades up to 2100. All values used are in 2007
USD. Illustratively, we then compare the costs to the
revenues of oil (at 61 USD per barrel, averaged over
the 2000–2016 period) to show how much of export
income could be affected by policies aiming to incor-
porate the SCC (i.e. mitigation policy could lead to a
tax on carbon that reduces revenue to exporters).
Compiling data from various sources, often col-
lected by individual countries, leads to varying levels
of accuracy [62], even though these databases are
widely used by researchers, state-of-the art and with
continuously updated data quality checks. Use of
times series reduces this uncertainty to some extent
as outliers in individual years can be detected, nev-
ertheless our estimates of the domestic, international
and global nexus should be considered illustrative.
3. Quantifying the water-energy-food
nexus
3.1. The domesticWEF nexus of Kuwait, Qatar and
Saudi Arabia
The GCC states rank among the world’s highest
energy consumers on a per capita basis [8]. In our
three case study states, domestic consumption ranges
from 9% to 20% of total oil and gas produced (fig-
ure 1 and table 1). Kuwait particularly has high water-
related energy use, mostly for desalination and a
small fraction to pump groundwater or treat waste
water. This requires a significant amount of oil, about
10 MBOE/year with 81 MBOE for other uses. Cool-
ing and electricity are other important energy users
in Kuwait. At 21 MBOE this comprises about 23% of
total domestic energy use (in Saudi Arabia 14% and
in Qatar 8%). Considerably less energy is used for
food production, reflecting the small domestic agri-
cultural sector in Kuwait and Qatar. Only in Saudi
Arabia, with its larger agriculture sector, is energy use
for food (directly, and indirectly via water-for-food)a
similar order of magnitude as energy use for water by
households (table 1).
In Saudi Arabia, nexus trade-offs between food
and water have been substantial, with massive over-
exploitation of fossil groundwater reserves to sus-
tain food production threatening future water secur-
ity [15, 67, 68]. Of the roughly 23 BCM of water
used annually, 85% was for irrigation, with only 10%
4
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Figure 1. Domestic water-energy-food nexus Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, in MBOE, and population [66], averaged over the
2000–2016 period. Arrows indicate the relative importance of linkages to the overall nexus, based on resource abundance or
scarcity.
of total use supplied by renewable water resources.
While the Arabian aquifer system underlying Saudi
Arabia is vast [69], only a fraction is economically
useable with most too deep to be abstracted or too
saline to be directly used [67]. This situation led to the
realisation that remaining water resources should be
preserved for higher valued industrial and domestic
uses, which promoted a policy shift away from food
self-sufficiency after 2006 towards greater reliance on
imports. The remaining irrigation is now primarily
targeted at high value crops [15, 70]. While this has
reduced overexploitation of groundwater it has not
eliminated it [15].
In the smaller, highly urbanized city states, Kuwait
and Qatar, there is no conflict between land used for
food production and for water harvesting or energy
generation. Production of biofuels is non-existent.
Using land to harvest water is equally rare in the
desert.While renewable water resources are obviously
very limited, and there is clearly a challenge to use
less and reuse more, overall nexus trade-offs between
domestic sectors are small. Kuwait for example, has
minimal annual renewable water resources, mostly
consisting of groundwater inflow from Saudi Arabia,
estimated at about 20 million cubic meter (MCM)
according to AQAUSTAT to 45 MCM [71] per year.
Kuwait’s groundwater extraction exceeds the aquifer’s
capacity almost tenfold resulting in poor quality of
extracted water [71]. However, these volumes are
small compared to an estimated desalination capacity
of almost 1400 MCM in 2016, which fulfils Kuwait’s
domestic drinking water demand. Irrigation water
use amounts to an estimated 200–500 MCM of water
per year, part brackish groundwater and part reuse
of domestic waste water (~275 MCM); indicating a
nexus synergy rather than a trade-off. Net water use
estimates for the oil sector are rare, but using the
water use per barrel of oil intensity estimates from
Kuwait, a range of 30 MCM to 180 MCM per year
is derived, only part groundwater, part seawater and
an unknown part recycled. Most cooling of thermal
power plants is done using seawater [12] thereby
avoiding trade-offs with other water uses.
3.2. Exports, imports and the nexus
More important is the ‘International Nexus’, in which
limited domestic food production is compensated
for by imports financed by oil and gas (i.e. energy)
exports that dominate the nexus (figure 1). In Kuwait,
food imports represent a value of 35 MBOE which, at
4% of total oil export revenue, is relatively small. In
years with low oil and high food prices, however, the
food import-oil export proportion increases, becom-
ing as high as 8% in 2014. Similarly, forQatar the food
import-oil export proportion is less than 3% on aver-
age, but it peaked at 7% in 2002. Saudi Arabia repor-
ted the highest proportion, on average 6%, but 10%
in 2015.
Imported food requires land, water, energy and
nutrient resources in other parts of the world. The
availability of food for import and its price is sub-
ject to local WEF nexus interactions, which means
that importing food increases vulnerability to nexus
trade-offs elsewhere. Figure 2 shows annual imports
from major exporting countries to Kuwait, Qatar
and Saudi Arabia, for rice and wheat. Saudi Arabia’s
5
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Figure 2. Origin of imports of rice and wheat (in 1000 tonnes per year), and embedded total annual GWD (in grey, on the
secondary y-axis). Note: y-axis scales differ. The zero embedded GWD values reflect no imports from countries with GWD.
abandonment of its wheat self-sufficiency policy
around 2006 is clearly visible in its increased import
volumes. Wheat imports are dominated by Aus-
tralia and Canada, two countries with—in normal
years—a large food surplus from crops grownmainly
under rainfed conditions. Threats to imports from
nexus trade-offs play less of a role here, though
changes in global demand—i.e. reduced production
elsewhere—might affect future prices. In addition,
there are a range of other countries exporting wheat.
Rice imports mainly come from India. Qatar relies
strongly on imports from Pakistan. Both India and
Pakistan are countries that have abundant water
resources seasonally, but that suffer from declining
groundwater levels due to over-abstraction especially
in rice growing areas like the Punjab [72–75].
The shift away from food self-sufficiency in Saudi
Arabia to a higher reliance on wheat imports after
2006 has had a marginal effect on imported GWD
(figure 2). GWD embedded in wheat rose slightly
to 24 MCM in 2013, mainly because of increased
imports from the USA, before decreasing again, with
imports then originating mainly from Europe where
wheat is grown mostly rainfed or in areas where
groundwater use is sustainable. Fluctuations in GWD
reflect both fluctuations in total imports as well as
shifts in the origin of imports and thereby the GWD
contained in those imports. An upward trend in
GWD embedded in rice imports to Saudi Arabia,
reflecting an increase in demand as result of popu-
lation growth. Both Kuwait and Qatar reduced their
imports from Pakistan in recent years, so that GWD
declined even though total rice imports increased.
Figure 3 shows the amount of embedded GWD
in food trade links. This highlights food imports that
contribute to groundwater depletion in export coun-
tries, mostly Pakistan and India. We use the approach
and data from Dalin, Wada [18], who estimated a
total global exported GWD of 25.6 BCM for 2010.
While Saudi Arabia’s rice imports embed the largest
share of GWD, Qatar’s per capita embedded GWD
(not shown) is higher because of its reliance on rice
imports from Pakistan. Although these three coun-
tries have a total population of just 30 million, less
than half a percent of the global population [66], the
GWD embedded in their rice imports accounts for
almost 2% of the global total GWD of all crops. The
GWD embedded in wheat imports is minor.
3.3. Climate change; adding the cost of carbon to
the nexus
Climate change strongly links the nexus of GCC
countries to the global scale. Figure 4 illustrates the
social costs of carbon (SCC) as a percentage of the
total oil export revenues, according to the midrange
estimate of the SCC as used by the US Environmental
Protection Agency (42 USD/tCO2), and alternative
marginal cost estimates with a median marginal cost
price of 33 USD/tCO2 in 2020 as reported by Dietz
et al [65] to stay within the 2 ◦C limit. A more ambi-
tious maximum 1.5 ◦C temperature level, considered
safer would raise this price to 50 USD/tCO2 in 2020
[65]. The cost of food imports in Kuwait as a per-
centage of total cost of carbon-corrected oil reven-
ues under the 1.5 ◦C limit would rise to an average of
17%, inQatar 9% and in Saudi Arabia as high as 24%.
7
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Figure 3. Virtual water imports to Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia in rice and wheat produced with unsustainable groundwater
(based on Dalin et al [18]), as an average over 2000–2016, with totals in MCM. The colour of the ribbon, in lighter shade,
corresponds with the border colour of the exporting countries. Note the difference in total GWD between rice and wheat.
Figure 4. Cost of carbon as a fraction of total oil revenues of
Kuwait, average over 2000–2016, and compared with the
cost of food imports expressed as MBOE. Each barrel
represents 10 MBOE, with total export revenues 825 MBO.
In light grey an estimate of the marginal cost of carbon in
2010 to keep global temperature increase below 2 ◦C
33 USD/tCO2, 23% of the price a barrel of oil at average
2000–2016 prices), in medium grey the social cost of
carbon 42 USD/tCO2, 30% of the price a barrel of oil)[64],
representing a mid-range discount rate value (source: U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency [76]) and in dark grey
the additional costs estimated for a 1.5
◦
C target
50 USD/tCO2, 63% of the price of a barrel of oil. Source:
Dietz et al [65]).
However, the price of carbon will not be constant,
for example, it needs to rise steeply to drive further
mitigation andmaintain temperatures within 2 ◦C or
1.5 ◦C. This would imply an even larger impact on oil
revenues.
With global progress on international commit-
ments to reduce fossil fuel use slow, and carbon
prices still very low in those countries that have
implemented emission trading schemes, the SCC val-
ues derived through modelling studies are highly
uncertain [65]. Therefore, the comparison in figure
4 should only be considered as illustrative of the
magnitude of potential impact. Moreover, a price
on carbon cannot be translated one-on-one into a
future reduction in revenues as demand is not fully
elastic. And reduced demand will not impact pro-
ducers equally; GCC countries have a comparative
cost advantage, with large reserves easily exploitable.
Any reduction in demand is likely to first reduce pro-
duction from more costly sources. Commitment to a
2 ◦C maximum increase in temperature above pre-
industrial levels, globally, would require over 430 bil-
lion barrels of oil and 95 trillion cubic metres of gas,
currently classified as reserves, remain unburned by
2050 [77]. The Middle East possesses over half of the
unburnable global oil (and gas) reserves leaving over
260 billion of barrels in the ground, almost 40% of its
oil reserves [77], but with coal and oil production in
other regions being phased out first—assuming that
countries and consumers behave in an economically
rational fashion.
Apart from costs, timing is important. The 1.5 ◦C
ambition requires a decarbonisation of energy sup-
ply that is more rapid and profound than in 2 ◦C-
consistent scenarios. Dietz et al [65] indicate that an
energy-system transformation with about 50% addi-
tional decarbonisation compared to a 2 ◦C scen-
ario is needed, starting sooner. Early CO2 reduc-
tions in 1.5 ◦C-consistent scenarios are achieved
through reductions in the power sector [78], but by
2050 most of the supply-side mitigation potential
is already used—also when aiming to keep warm-
ing to 2 ◦C. Moving to 1.5 ◦C relies on much
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stronger emission reductions on end-use sectors such
as industry, transport and buildings [78], and, thus,
those sectors consuming most oil. Again, this sug-
gests there is some time left to adjust Saudi Arabia,
Qatar and Kuwait’s economy to changes in oil and gas
demand, but with a 1.5 ◦C target, impacts will be felt
sooner.
Finally, climate change will have an impact on
the amount of food produced elsewhere—e.g. in Aus-
tralia’s grain belt [79] or rice production in the Indo-
Gangetic plain [80], affecting global food availability
and prices. Not only will gradual changes in produc-
tion matter, but also their volatility; major food price
spikes in 2007/8 illustrate that even a perceived short-
age due to compounding climate impacts in multiple
food producing regions can lead strong responses in
restrictions on trade with impacts on prices [81].
Compared to poorer importing countries, e.g. in sub-
Saharan Africa, the GCC states are still well endowed
to buffer any shocks, but lack of alternative sources of
food production means the region remains exposed.
4. Discussion and conclusion
This paper advances understanding of the nexus—
taking three GCC states as examples—by studying the
interconnections between three nexus elements, over
multiple scales and using comparable units (BOE)
to address issues of incommensurate units. At the
domestic scale, WEF trade-offs are generally modest,
dominated by energy and while there are issues of
water scarcity, trade-offs between sectors at this level
are relatively small because water scarcity limits agri-
cultural production and surplus fossil fuel resources
compensate through desalination and food trade.
Partial analysis of the nexus can obscure important
linkages; while the dependence of water use on oil
has been well illustrated [12], we show that the water-
food linkage, through oil exports and food imports,
is of a considerably higher magnitude. Moreover,
dependency on food imports in terms of export rev-
enue is dynamic over time, fluctuating from about
4% on average up to 10% for Saudi Arabia in 2015,
when oil prices were low. While high oil export rev-
enues shield GCC states from the immediate impacts
of higher prices, they would not fully buffer exposure
to sudden export restrictions in exporting countries.
At the International scale, nexus analysis high-
lights more significant resource interdependencies,
which play out both inwards, as a domestic chal-
lenge (e.g. an increasing part of the budget is spent
on food imports) and outwards, affecting sustain-
able use of resources in source countries. Saudi Ara-
bia’s shift in 2006 to importing wheat appears to
have resolved a domestic nexus stress without increas-
ing nexus stress elsewhere. Importing rice, however,
partly relies on areas abroad with high nexus stresses
(e.g. Pakistan and India). Groundwater depletion is
continuing, especially in the Indus basin, covering
most of Pakistan, and the Indian part of the Punjab,
a major rice and wheat growing area where climate
change and increased domestic demand is expected to
lead to further water stress [80, 82]. At the same time,
exports to the GCC provide valuable foreign currency
for poorer exporting countries that have sovereignty
in choosing with whom to trade. More investment
in better agricultural water management in export-
ing countries, e.g. to increase efficient use of water
without negatively affecting downstream users, often
a complex trade-off [83], can help maintain export
revenues while reducing water stress.
At the global scale, while uncertainty remains
about future international climate policy and its
implications for oil and gas revenues, our exploratory
analysis suggests that implementation of measures to
account for the SCC, assuming the costs were to be
applied as a tax, would significantly impact export
revenues. There is some, although limited, time to
adjust the WEF nexus to the changes in demand for
fossil fuels. These findings are illustrative as they rely
on the major assumption that countries and con-
sumers behave in an economically rational fashion in
which coal and oil production in most costly regions
will be phased out first. Our analysis of the SCC is
a kind of ‘stress test’ of the countries’ reliance on oil
revenue to subsidise other nexus sector requirements.
Here we use scenarios of global climate change mitig-
ation policy. Additional scenarios might include price
shocks in oil or price and availability shocks in food
for other reasons.
Several linkages were not taken into account in
this assessment. High rates of groundwater pump-
ingwill affect ecosystem functioning. Salinization and
increased temperatures of coastal zones, due to the
discharge of cooling water, desalination and drain-
age of irrigation and domestic return flows in the
sea is another concern [84]. Transboundary dimen-
sions, e.g. Kuwait and Qatar sharing groundwater
reserves with neighbouring Saudi Arabia, were not
addressed. Furthermore, the expansion of renewables
could potentially replace a large proportion of cur-
rent domestic energy demand [85, 86]. In addition
to embedded GWD in food trade, excessive surface
water extractions affecting environmental flows could
be taken into account [87, 88]. Finally, issues with
data consistency and missing values underscore the
need for caution in the interpretation of absolute val-
ues presented here.
While the abundance of fossil fuels in combina-
tionwith an arid climate creates a specific nexus in the
countries studied, we are cautious about generalising
from our findings. Comparability of the three coun-
tries lies in the reliance on a dominant export com-
modity to sustain an increasingly urbanized popula-
tion with an energy intensive lifestyle. Though other
countries within the GCC and the broader Middle
East and Northern Africa region are more populous
and/orwithmore diverse economies, a strong reliance
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on fossil fuel exports to provide basic commodities
and services in most cases still holds true. The value
of a nexus analysis dominated by a single sector (com-
modity), in this case energy (oil), lies in revealing
the nexus trade-offs it obscures, which, as we show,
appear when moving beyond the domestic scale.
In terms of policy implications, a multitude
of institutions are responsible for managing (parts
of) the nexus in Arab countries, with so far little
cooperation and overlapping competencies, and silo-
thinking [89]. El Hajj et al [68] recommend a set of
actions to improve regional cooperation on the nexus,
for instance through increased knowledge building
and sharing, private sector mobilisation for finan-
cing and integration of existing institutions. Al-Saidi
and Elagib [50] identify different concrete institu-
tional arrangements for implementing the nexus,
with differing levels of comprehensiveness and act-
ors involved. However, the political situation in the
GCC strongly determines nexus resource allocations
within sectors and society, and skews the political-
economy of decision making [90]—GCC states oper-
ate a political-economy as ‘super rentier states’ [90],
where the economy relies predominantly on rents
from oil extraction and both taxation and polit-
ical representation are largely absent. The role of
resource subsidies in the social contract (cheap water,
energy and food) in legitimising non-democratic
governance therefore greatly constrains the polit-
ical incentives and decision-making space for WEF
choices.
While the political route maybe more challen-
ging in GCC states than in other regions, quantitat-
ive assessments such as this may provide some entry
points for further action. Greater understanding of
nexus interlinkages at different scales can help char-
acterise risks to resource security and clarify the range
of actors involved in and affected by decisions, and
the relevant institutional levels for response. In par-
ticular, our analysis highlights areas of risk relating
to dependency on food imports with costs that can
vary considerably and unpredictably over time and
importantly in some cases with significant environ-
mental externalities in source regions. Furthermore
the global framing in terms of measures to account
for the social costs of carbon highlights the poten-
tial significance for export revenues. A WEF nexus
approach captures interdependencies that bring risks
to supply security such as environmental external-
ities in key imports that would be missed in a less
comprehensive analysis. As our analysis of the poten-
tial impact of climate mitigation shows, energy dom-
inance in the GCC might wane. As a result, the
governance system which relies predominantly on
rents from oil extraction would come under increas-
ing strain. Nexus analyses can help evaluate the
multi-sectoral consequences of and responses to such
shifts.
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